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Abstract
I analyze how lack of commitment a®ects the maturity structure of sovereign
debt. Governments balance bene¯ts of default induced redistribution and costs
due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long-
term debt a®ects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The
equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of
debt that re°ect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior
maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity
structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely.
These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign borrowers exert considerable e®ort to structure their debt maturities optimally.
This is di±cult to reconcile with predictions of a frictionless benchmark model in which
gross ¯nancial positions and thus, the maturity structure are indeterminate and only net
positions a®ect agents' wealth and incentives (as in Modigliani and Miller (1958) and
Barro (1974)).
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1In this paper, I o®er an explanation for borrowers' scrupulous choice of maturity, argu-
ing that lack of commitment paired with social losses in the wake of a default undermines
the neutrality of the maturity structure. Focusing on these two factors appears natural.
After all, a large literature concerned with sovereign borrowing emphasizes the pervasive-
ness of limited contract enforceability while providing strong evidence for the presence of
social losses in the aftermath of defaults.1
I consider a government issuing real non-contingent debt of various maturities. Suc-
cessive governments (or selves of the government) decide whether, and to what extent,
to honor maturing debt. They also choose the level of taxation and new debt issuance
to ¯nance contemporaneous debt repayment as well as exogenous government purchases.
The government's desire to redistribute from foreign bondholders to domestic taxpayers
creates an incentive to default on the maturing debt which interacts with an opposing
incentive to avoid the cost of defaulting.2 I model this cost as temporary income losses
for taxpayers, serving as stand-in for various types of social losses discussed in the liter-
ature. Both bondholders and the government form rational expectations. The price of
debt maturities therefore re°ects their expected repayment rate, and government policy
is subgame perfect.
In equilibrium, the risk-adjusted returns on short- and long-term funding are identical
and the optimal maturity structure is determined on the demand side. In particular, it
is critically shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt, re°ecting the price
impact of default and rollover choices by subsequent policy makers. Under plausible
conditions, such inframarginal revenue losses normalized by the price of debt are a con-
vex function of the quantity of a maturity issued. Optimal policy therefore amounts to
\smoothing" the revenue losses on inframarginal units of maturities, in parallel with the
familiar tax (distortion) smoothing prescription. As default renders debt state contingent,
this smoothing prescription interacts with standard portfolio choice considerations.
In a benchmark case with exponentially distributed costs in the wake of debt repudia-
tion, default and rollover decisions are independent of the stock of outstanding debt. As a
consequence, spillover e®ects between di®erent maturities are minimal and the smoothing
prescription implies a fully balanced maturity structure. If default costs are distributed
according to any other distribution with increasing hazard (guaranteeing uniqueness of
the equilibrium maturity structure), then outstanding debt depresses short-term debt is-
suance. Long-term debt issuance therefore increases the debt maturing in the long term
by less than one-to-one, reducing the associated inframarginal losses and giving rise to an
optimal maturity structure that is tilted towards the long end.
Higher quantities of debt reduce this cost advantage of long-term debt, inducing a
1See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for an overview over the literature. Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) and
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006, pp. 49{52), among many other authors, provide strong evidence
that sovereign defaults are costly.
2The incentive to default might alternatively derive from the government's desire to transfer funds
from the private to the public sector, in order to avoid tax distortions. Focusing on the redistributive
motive is attractive for two reasons. On the one hand, con°ict between interest groups indeed appears to
a®ect governments' default decisions, see the discussion later in the text. On the other hand, abstracting
from tax distortions allows to disregard a second source of time inconsistency, related to the optimal
timing of taxes (Lucas and Stokey, 1983).
2more balanced maturity structure. This has direct implications for the debt portfolio
over the cycle: In periods with high marginal utility where total debt issuance increases,
the maturity structure shortens. The same result holds even if default costs are distributed
exponentially, provided that these costs tend to be lower in times of scarce resources.
In a second benchmark case analyzed, default costs are dependent over time such that
a default on maturing debt triggers a (subsequent) default on currently outstanding debt
as well. Under this assumption, default probabilities depend on the stock of maturing
and outstanding debt, rendering the default decision dynamic. Long-term debt issuance
is always dominated by short-term issuance in this case and the maturity structure is
concentrated on the short end.
The broad picture that emerges from the model is one of an interior maturity structure
with positive gross positions, in line with the empirical evidence, but in contrast with pre-
dictions from models that stress the role of the maturity structure in completing markets
or avoiding rollover crises (see below). The model predicts a shortening of the maturity
structure when debt issuance is high, in line with evidence summarized by Rodrik and
Velasco (1999); around times of low output (\crises"), consistent with the evidence re-
ported by Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2007); and in periods with increased risk
of cross default and acceleration.3 Since the model predictions relate to the quantities of
di®erent maturities (rather than just their ratios, say), the model o®ers a theory of the
equilibrium level of debt in addition to a theory of its structure.
As mentioned before, revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt play a central role in
the model. Closely related to these revenue losses, previous literature has emphasized debt
dilution as a consequence of lack of commitment. In particular, it has been pointed out
that debt issuance reduces the value of outstanding debt and that this e®ect may increase
governments' incentives to issue new debt ex post.4 In contrast, the revenue losses of
interest in the present paper arise with respect to contemporaneously issued debt and
are fully internalized by the government seeking funding. Ex-post bene¯ts from diluting
outstanding debt therefore contrast with ex-ante costs of issuing new debt maturities, due
to the social losses associated with a default.
Importantly, these ¯ndings derive from entirely standard premises. For example, the
assumption that debt contracts stipulate non-contingent payments and social losses are
triggered in the absence of contractually speci¯ed gross payments is standard, presumably
re°ecting the notion that informational constraints prevent sovereign borrowers from en-
tering into more sophisticated ¯nancial arrangements. The present paper does not address
the question of why such constraints arise, nor does it rationalize other central tenets in
the sovereign debt literature, in particular lack of commitment. Instead, the paper main-
3According to Rodrik and Velasco (1999), \the overall debt burden (debt/GDP ratio) is positively
correlated with short-term borrowing in the time-series (but not in the cross-section). One interpretation
is that countries that go on a borrowing binge are forced to shorten the maturity of their external liabilities
in the short run" (p. 21). According to Broner et al. (2007) \emerging economies issue relatively more
short-term debt during periods of ¯nancial turmoil, and wait for tranquil times to issue longterm debt"
(p. 3).
4Dilution may be present even if outstanding debt is prioritized, see Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) who
analyze the case where increased borrowing leads a borrower to take actions that lower the probability
of repayment.
3tains the standard set of assumptions and analyzes the determinants of sovereign debt
maturity within their context.
Related Literature Lack of commitment and the associated di±culty to sustain bor-
rowing take center stage in the sovereign debt literature. Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Fischer (1980) discuss the government's ex-post incentive to default when taxes are
distorting. In Tabellini (1991), Dixit and Londregan (2000), Kremer and Mehta (2000)
or Niepelt (2004), distributive motives counteract these incentives.5
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) suggest that the threat of ¯nancial autarky discourages
strategic default. For discussions and applications of this hypothesis as well as analyses
of the role played by the available ¯nancial instruments, see Bulow and Rogo® (1989b),
Grossman and Han (1999), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Alvarez and Jermann (2000),
Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, ch. 19), among many others.
Cole and Kehoe (1998) and Sandleris (2006) argue that a sovereign default serves as a
negative signal, inducing parties outside of the credit relationship to initiate actions that
are costly for the government. More direct default costs of the type considered here
are present, for example, in the models of Bulow and Rogo® (1989a), Bulow and Rogo®
(1989b), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).6
To motivate an optimal maturity structure, some authors suggest that short-term
debt renders a country vulnerable to rollover crises, and that long-term debt reduces such
vulnerability (Calvo, 1988; Alesina, Prati and Tabellini, 1990; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990;
Rodrik and Velasco, 1999; Cole and Kehoe, 2000). Chamon (2007) proposes a mechanism
to eliminate the coordination failure associated with rollover crises. Phelan (2004) draws
a distinction between the maturity of debt and the sequencing of debt rollovers which
matters for crises. Broner et al. (2007) argue that supply side features induce emerging
markets to borrow short-term in spite of the increased risk of a rollover crisis. In their
model, lenders are risk averse and heavily exposed to the price risk of long-term emerging-
markets debt. Higher quantities of long-term debt therefore drive up term premia and
thus, the cost of long-term funding.
Angeletos (2002) argues that a su±ciently rich maturity structure of non-contingent
bonds may serve as a substitute for state-contingent debt by completing markets for the
government (see also Gale, 1990). Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2008) document that the
quantitative implications of this \complete market approach" are at odds with the data.
Closer in spirit to the present paper, Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and Missale and
Blanchard (1994) discuss the role of the maturity structure of nominal debt for the gov-
ernment's incentive to engineer surprise in°ation. Hatchondo and Martinez (2008) analyze
numerically how the duration of government debt a®ects debt issuance, default choices
and risk premia (see also Arellano and Ramanarayanan, 2008). Finally, a large literature
5The model of this paper is silent about the choice of maturity structure in countries whose debt is
perceived to be default-risk free. Choices of debt structure in those countries appear to be a®ected by
liquidity concerns. In the UK, for example, the Debt Management O±ce \argues that cost is not the only
factor. There is a virtue in being predictable, and in keeping all sections of the bond market supplied
with debt to trade" (The Economist, \Losing interest," June 14th 2008).
6See also Tirole (2006, p. 180) where a default might trigger a costly loss of social capital.
4in corporate ¯nance analyzes the role of asymmetric information and control rights for
the ¯nancial structure of ¯rms (for an overview, see Hart, 1995; Tirole, 2006); see Jeanne
(2004) for an application in the sovereign debt context.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
main analysis is contained in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes the maturity structure
in several special cases of the model. Section 5 analyzes an extension of the basic model
with cross default, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Time is discrete and indexed by n = 0;1;2;:::. There is a government that levies taxes,
tn, and issues debt of various maturities, fbnmg, at prices fqnmg. Here, the ¯rst and second
index of a debt maturity or its price denote the issuance and maturity dates, respectively.
The debt maturity bnm promises a return in period m that is independent of the state
of nature in that period. Without loss of generality, exogenous government spending is
normalized to zero.
2.1 Private Sector
All government debt is held by foreign investors while all taxes are paid by domestic agents.
Taxpayers do not save nor borrow.7 The assumption that the two groups of taxpayers
and investors do not \overlap" is unimportant for the central results, but simpli¯es the
analysis. Modeling a mixed rather than concentrated ownership structure of debt would
require a theory of how the ownership structure is determined in equilibrium.8 No such
theory is available that would appear plausible in the current context.9 Assuming that
taxpayers do not save also rationalizes why the government issues debt in the ¯rst place,
in spite of taxes being non-distorting.
Taxpayers have time- and state-additive preferences over consumption and discount
the future according to the discount factor ± 2 (0;1). Conditional on current and antici-
pated state-contingent incomes yu












Here, sn denotes the state at time n, to be speci¯ed in more detail later. I will focus
7Mankiw (2000) or Matsen, Sveen and Torvik (2005) analyze ¯scal policy in economies with \savers"
and \spenders."
8In equilibrium, the government's default decision depends on the ownership structure of debt relative
to the distribution of tax burdens across the population, see below. Changes in the ownership structure
therefore a®ect the default decision ex post and thus, investment decisions ex ante.
9Tabellini (1991) and Dixit and Londregan (2000) provide theories of the ownership structure of debt.
They assume that households can only save in government debt (Tabellini, 1991), or that the return on
the only alternative asset is household speci¯c (Dixit and Londregan, 2000). Both assumptions are not
applicable in the current context. See also Niepelt (2004).
5throughout on Markov equilibria, excluding arti¯cial state variables of the type sustaining
trigger strategies. The utility function u(¢) is strictly increasing and concave.
Investors are risk neutral and have access to a large international capital market with
a riskfree interest rate equal to ¯¡1;¯ 2 (0;1). In equilibrium, newly issued government
debt therefore pays an expected return of ¯¡1 per period.
2.2 Government
The government maximizes the welfare of taxpayers.10 Policies are chosen sequentially
and political decision makers cannot commit their successors (or future selves). In each
period n, the government in power therefore chooses taxes as well as the repayment rate,
rn 2 [0;1], on the debt maturing in the period, bxn ´
Pn¡1
l=0 bln. While all maturing debt
is treated equally, independently of its issuance date (pari passu), a government's default
decision only applies with respect to the contemporaneously maturing debt. This feature
is a direct consequence of the government's lack of commitment: Being unable to tie the
hands of its successors, a government cannot force its successors to pay a certain rate of
return, for example zero. Nevertheless, cross default on outstanding debt may of course
occur as an equilibrium outcome; see the discussion in Section 5.
A large literature on sovereign debt discusses the restrictions that lack of commitment
imposes on a government's ability to issue debt. As mentioned in the introduction, this
literature suggests that various default costs are responsible for a government's decision
to honor its obligations ex post rather than renege on them. Following that literature, I
assume that a government default|de¯ned as a situation where the repayment rate falls
short of unity|triggers income losses for taxpayers (cf. Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Cole
and Kehoe, 2000; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2008). Ex post, the government
therefore balances the bene¯t to taxpayers of a default induced reduction of government
spending and the cost to taxpayers of default induced income losses.
I restrict attention to temporary income losses in the wake of a default. In particular,
I assume that a default in period n on debt maturing in period n triggers an income loss
Ln ¸ 0; Ln is the realization of an i.i.d. random variable with cumulative distribution
function F(¢) and associated probability density function f(¢). (The i.i.d. assumption
simpli¯es notation; it is relaxed at a later stage.) I assume that f(L) > 0 for all L > 0.
The government learns about the realization of Ln at the beginning of the period, before
choosing its policy instruments.
The assumption of temporary income losses is motivated by two considerations. First,
temporary costs constitute a natural benchmark. Second, and more importantly, they ap-
pear plausible. While permanent exclusion from trade or credit markets and other forms
of long-term punishment may serve as threat points, such permanent costs are unlikely
10If the government maximized a weighted average of taxpayers' and investors' welfare and attached
a su±ciently large weight to the welfare of investors, interior repayment rates might result, in contrast
to what follows. If the government attached a strictly positive weight to the welfare of investors and if
investors were risk averse, the wealth of investors would enter the government's program, in contrast to
what follows.
6to be realized in equilibrium if a defaulting sovereign and its lenders can renegotiate.11
Suppose, for example, that the sovereign chooses between either repaying, or not repaying
and entering into a bargaining process with lenders. This process takes one period, gener-
ating income losses Ln, and results in a settlement where lenders secure a strictly positive
repayment rate, ¹ rn > 0. The analysis in this paper is consistent with this interpretation
although it abstracts from any safe return component on sovereign debt (as implied by
¹ rn > 0).
As a consequence of the default induced income losses, the income of taxpayers in
period n is given by
y
u
n = yn ¡ 1[rn<1]Ln;
where yn denotes the exogenous income component and 1[x] denotes the indicator function
for event x.
Section 5 analyzes the implications of an alternative assumption about default costs
according to which a default in period n on debt maturing in period n renders subsequent
defaults on debt outstanding in period n costless.
2.3 Equilibrium
Conditional on an inherited maturity structure and the exogenous income process, an
equilibrium as of period n consists of a state-contingent sequence of policies (tax rates,
repayment rates, issuance of debt maturities) and debt prices such that
i. the policy sequence maximizes Un;




qijbij = bxiri for all i ¸ n;
iii. the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is satis¯ed; and
iv. investors are willing to buy newly issued debt,
qij = ¯
j¡iE[rjjsi] for all i;j ¸ n:
Lack of commitment imposes additional equilibrium conditions. A time-consistent
equilibrium as of period n consists of a sequence of policies and debt prices such that
i. policies and prices constitute an equilibrium; and
ii. anticipated policies coincide with the actual policies that successive governments
optimally choose to implement.
11Empirically, defaulting countries are not excluded from credit markets inde¯nitely.
7The objective of the government in period n to select the \best" time-consistent equi-
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j¡iE[rjjsi]bij = bxiri for all i ¸ n; NPG condition:
Outstanding debt as of period n that was issued before period n and will mature in period
i is denoted by bxni: bxni ´
Pn¡1
l=0 bli; i ¸ n. Accordingly, bxnn = bxn.
Since no debt is outstanding in the initial period, bx0i = 0 for all i ¸ 0, investors
are insulated against the e®ects of policy ex ante. Due to rational expectations, all
debt is priced at its fundamental value and no default-induced redistribution occurs in
equilibrium.13 In contrast, the ex-ante welfare of taxpayers does depend on policy. First,
because the timing of tax collections determines the smoothness of taxpayers' consumption
and thus, utility. Second, because default reduces taxpayers' income.
3 Analysis
I focus on the case with two maturities, short- and long-term debt. The former matures
after one period, the latter after two. Accordingly, the state of the economy in period n is
given by the tuple sn = (yn;Ln;bx;n;bx;n;n+1). (If the horizon is ¯nite, time constitutes an
additional state variable. The notation adopted in the following re°ects this case.) The
government's budget de¯cit in period n is given by
dn ´ bn;n+1¯E[rn+1jsn] + bn;n+2¯
2E[rn+2jsn]:
3.1 Optimal Debt Repayment
Consider ¯rst the government's choice of repayment rate, rn. Due to the temporary nature
of the default costs, this choice is static in nature. Substituting the government's budget
constraint in the expression for taxpayers' disposable income in period n, the choice of rn
maximizes
yn ¡ 1[rn<1]Ln ¡ bx;nrn + dn:
Since the marginal cost of reducing rn equals zero for rn < 1, the optimal repayment rate





1 if Ln ¸ bx;n
0 if Ln < bx;n
(1)
12I abstract from assets other than government debt. This assumption is not restrictive if the discount
factor is su±ciently low. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2007) simulate a calibrated model with short term debt
and a riskfree asset for savings. They ¯nd that an optimizing sovereign does not accumulate assets since
doing so (rather than reducing the stock of debt) would unnecessarily undermine credibility.
13Ex post, investors are of course \vulnerable" because they are directly a®ected by the government's
choice of repayment rate.
8and the government defaults whenever maturing debt exceeds the income losses in the
wake of a default. This implication of the model is consistent with the notion that gov-
ernments tend to default when the associated political cost|i.e., income losses of pivotal
pressure groups|is low.14 Governments also tend to default when economic activity is
depressed (Borensztein, Levy Yegati and Panizza, 2006; Tomz and Wright, 2007). The
model is consistent with this fact as well if it is slightly extended to include a direct default
cost for the government in addition to the income losses for taxpayers.15
Corner solutions for the optimal repayment rate follow under more general assumptions
about default costs than those invoked here, see the discussion in Appendix A. Interior
repayment rates would only arise if income losses in the wake of a default were a convex
function of the default rate (implausible, as argued in Appendix A) or the government
attached su±ciently strong weight to the welfare of foreign investors (implausible as well).
Equation (1) pins down debt prices: The price of short-term debt, issued in period n,
is given by
qn;n+1 = ¯E[rn+1jsn] = ¯(1 ¡ F(bx;n;n+1 + bn;n+1)); (2)
while the price of long-term debt satis¯es
qn;n+2 = ¯
2E[rn+2jsn] = ¯
2E[1 ¡ F(bn;n+2 + bn+1;n+2)jsn]: (3)
The price of each maturity is decreasing in its quantity. This negative dependence arises
because higher debt issuance reduces the probability of repayment. For the same rea-
son, higher inherited, outstanding debt reduces the price of short-term debt while higher
expected short-term debt issuance by the subsequent government (bn+1;n+2) reduces the
price of long-term debt.
3.2 Optimal Debt Issuance
From (2) and (3), the de¯cit in period n can be expressed as
dn = bn;n+1¯(1 ¡ F(bx;n;n+1 + bn;n+1)) + bn;n+2¯
2E[1 ¡ F(bn;n+2 + bn+1;n+2)jsn]:
Let b?
n;n+1(sn) and b?
n;n+2(sn) denote the optimal short- and long-term debt issuance of the
government in period n, respectively, and let d?
n denote the de¯cit along the equilibrium
















14Tomz (2002) documents that domestic audiences opposed Argentina to suspend debt payments in
1999 but supported such action two years later. Kohlscheen (2004) documents that parliamentary democ-
racies rarely resort to rescheduling (despite shorter o±ce terms of their executives), presumably because
domestic constituencies opposed to default are more likely to be politically in°uential in representative
democracies. MacDonald (2003) suggests that it is precisely in countries where a default does not gen-
erate clearly identi¯able winners and losers among politically in°uential groups where sovereign defaults
have been avoided.
15If default triggers a cost K to the government in addition to the income losses for taxpayers, the
default decision reduces to rn = 1 i® u(yn ¡bx;n +dn) ¸ u(yn ¡Ln + ¹ dn)¡K where the de¯cit following
repayment may di®er from the de¯cit following a default. Concavity of u(¢) implies that low income levels
render a default more likely.
9From the perspective of the government in period n that chooses bn;n+1 and bn;n+2,
issuing a particular maturity has two types of e®ects. On the one hand, it raises revenue,
in proportion to the price of the maturity. On the other hand, it a®ects the revenue
raised from inframarginal units of debt, by changing the repayment probability and thus,
price of these units. This second e®ect is a direct consequence of the government's lack
of commitment.
Formally, taking the rollover policy functions of the subsequent government as given,
























































respectively. According to the ¯rst equation, short-term debt increases the de¯cit in
proportion to the expected repayment rate, net of the above mentioned revenue e®ect
on inframarginal units. This revenue e®ect is composed of two parts since short-term
debt issuance does not only (directly) depress the price of short-term debt, but also
(indirectly) the price of long-term debt if the increase of bn;n+1 triggers responses by the
subsequent government; I refer to these two parts as In;ss and In;sl, respectively. According
to the second equation, long-term debt issuance has direct and indirect revenue e®ects
on inframarginal units as well, but only on newly-issued long-term debt; I refer to these
as In;ll. Revenue e®ects on inframarginal units along the equilibrium path are denoted
by a star, I?
n;ss etc. Note that, conditional on the rollover policy b?
n+1;n+2(sn+1) and the
level of outstanding debt, bx;n;n+1, the above marginal e®ects de¯ne the levels of short-
and long-term debt issuance that attain the maximum of the \debt-La®er surface."
Using (1) and substituting the government's budget constraint in the expression for
taxpayers' disposable income, the value function of the government in period n, Gn(sn),
satis¯es
Gn(sn) = u(yn ¡ min[bx;n;Ln] + d
?
n) + ±E[Gn+1(sn+1)jsn] (4)






The value function de¯nes the maximal payo® to the government in period n conditional
on the state variables sn. This maximal payo® is attained if the government defaults
optimally (as re°ected by the min[¢] operator) and issues the optimal amount of short-
and long-term debt (as re°ected by the functions b?
n;n+1(sn) and b?
n;n+2(sn) implicit in d?
n).
Debt issuance in turn determines the stock of the two maturities in the subsequent period,
as re°ected in the two constraints.
10I assume in the following that conditions are satis¯ed that render the government's
program well behaved, implying that the policy functions are smooth. Later, when con-
sidering special cases of the model, I verify that this is indeed the case.16





¡u0(yn ¡ bx;n + d?
n) if Ln ¸ bx;n
0 if Ln < bx;n
: (5)
According to (5), changes in the amount of maturing debt do not have an e®ect on
Gn(sn) if the debt is defaulted upon anyway. In those states where the government does
repay, in contrast, higher maturing debt reduces the government's value in proportion
to taxpayers' marginal utility of consumption. This negative e®ect arises because debt
repayment translates into higher taxes, notwithstanding the fact that a change of bx;n
may also lead to adjustments of short- and long-term debt issuance. Such adjustments do
not have a ¯rst-order e®ect on Gn(sn) and thus, are not re°ected in the above condition
since debt issuance is chosen optimally from the perspective of period n.





















= ¡(1 ¡ F(bx;n+1))E[u
0(yn+1 ¡ bx;n+1 + d
?
n+1)jsn];
where the last equality uses the independence of yn+1 and Ln+1. (The de¯cit d?
n+1 in the
last line is a function of bx;n+1;bx;n+1;n+2 and the realization of yn+1, given that Ln+1 ¸
bx;n+1.)
Consider next the e®ect of a marginal increase in the stock of outstanding debt. Dif-




























¡ ±(1 ¡ F(bx;n+1))E[u
0(yn+1 ¡ bx;n+1 + d
?
n+1)jsn]; (6)
where it is understood that the debt maturing in periods n + 1 and n + 2 depends on
b?
n;n+1(sn) and b?
n;n+2(sn), respectively. Again, indirect e®ects on Gn(sn) due to induced
adjustments of short- and long-term debt issuance in period n are not of ¯rst order.
16In general, the objective function is not concave in the amounts of debt issued, due to the option to
default. In particular, two features might undermine concavity. First, the fact that higher debt issuance
reduces the probability of repayment in the future. Second, if the price function is convex, the fact that
higher debt issuance implies increasingly smaller revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt.
11According to (6), higher outstanding debt has two e®ects on Gn(sn). On the one hand,
it a®ects contemporaneous felicity by changing the prices of short- and long-term debt
issued in period n and thus, taxes. This is re°ected in the I?
n terms in (6). On the other
hand, higher outstanding debt reduces taxpayers' felicity in those states in the subsequent
period where the outstanding debt is repaid. This e®ect is re°ected in the second term
on the right-hand side of (6).
With these results at hand, I now turn to a characterization of the debt issuance
choice. Consider ¯rst the choice of short-term debt. From (4), the e®ect of a marginal
increase in bn;n+1 in equilibrium is given by
u














which can be expressed as
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0(yn ¡ min[bx;n;Ln] + d
?
n) ¡ ±E[u





Condition (7) identi¯es two distinct e®ects of short-term debt issuance on the govern-
ment's objective. On the one hand, a consumption smoothing e®ect, represented by the
second line of (7) and re°ecting the fact that debt issuance allows to shift consumption
to periods when taxpayers' marginal utility of consumption is high. By issuing one unit
of short-term debt at price ¯(1 ¡ F(bx;n+1)), taxpayers increase the de¯cit by the corre-
sponding amount and gain marginal utility. At the same time, however, taxpayers face
lower future consumption in those states where the debt is repaid. This negative e®ect is
discounted at the discount factor ±.
On the other hand, the expression in the ¯rst line of condition (7) represents the
revenue e®ect on inframarginal units of debt, re°ecting lack of commitment and the fact
that the choice of bn;n+1 triggers responses by the subsequent government. These responses
partly run counter to the interests of the government issuing the debt. To see this, consider
the term I?
n;ss and suppose that the government wishes to raise revenue and issues short-
term debt, bn;n+1 > 0. The higher stock of maturing debt in the following period induces
the subsequent government to default more often, thereby depressing the issuance price
of the debt. From the perspective of the government in period n+1, the increased default
probability does not have welfare e®ects since the government in period n+1 is indi®erent
at the margin between repaying the debt or defaulting on it. From the perspective of the
government in period n, in contrast, the increased default probability is suboptimal as it
reduces the revenue raised through debt issuance without a corresponding gain. The fact
that the government in period n + 1 does not internalize the consequences of its choice
of repayment rate on its predecessor's revenue from debt issuance is at the source of the
time inconsistency problem analyzed in this paper.
In the alternative case where the government prematurely redeems outstanding long-
term debt (bn;n+1 < 0), the induced behavioral response in the subsequent period again
runs counter to the interests of the government in period n. For debt redemption increases
the expected repayment rate in the following period and therefore raises the price at which
12the government buys back its bonds. Both positive and negative choices of bn;n+1 therefore
are associated with a negative expression for I?
n;ss, indicating that such choices contribute
negatively to the government's objective. In contrast, the sign of the revenue e®ect on
inframarginal long-term debt, I?
n;sl, is ambiguous and depends on the sign of the induced
change of rollover policy in the subsequent period. If increased short-term debt issuance
induces the subsequent government to issue more short-term debt as well, then the default
probability on long-term debt increases, implying revenue losses on inframarginal units
of long-term debt. If the debt issuance induces reduced short-term debt issuance in the
following period, however, then such losses may be averted. Appendix B further discusses
the revenue e®ects on inframarginal units of debt, focusing on the role played by social
(rather than private) losses in the wake of a default in shaping these e®ects.
Consider next the choice of long-term debt. From (4), the e®ect of a marginal increase
in bn;n+2 in equilibrium is given by
u












which can be expressed as
u































Parallel to (7), expression (8) contains a consumption-smoothing e®ect (represented by
the expression in the last line) and a revenue e®ect on inframarginal units. In contrast to
(7), the revenue e®ect in (8) arises with respect to both contemporaneous and subsequent
debt issuance. This is a direct consequence of the fact that long-term debt issuance a®ects
subsequent short-term debt issuance, and that the e®ect of the latter on revenue raised
in period n remains unaccounted for by the government in period n + 1.
If short-term debt issuance is interior, combining the marginal e®ects (7) and (8) and
using the de¯nition of prices yields an alternative, instructive representation of (8):
u
0(yn ¡ min[bx;n;Ln] + d
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Condition (9) displays in the ¯rst line the consumption-smoothing e®ect from long-term
debt that is prematurely redeemed after one period. The second line re°ects the rev-
enue e®ect on inframarginal units of long-term debt due to long-term debt issuance. A
comparison of conditions (7) and (9) reveals that short-term debt smoothes consumption
between period n and the repayment states in period n+1, while long-term debt smoothes
consumption between period n and all states in period n + 1. Furthermore, short- and
long-term debt generate di®erent revenue e®ects on inframarginal units of debt.
To put these results into perspective, it is useful to recall the benchmark case with
commitment, distinguishing between an environment with safe debt on the one hand and
state-contingent debt on the other. If the government could commit its successors to
13honor maturing debt at face value, all I? terms in the expressions above would be absent;
all min[bx;n;Ln] terms would be replaced by bx;n; and all repayment probabilities would
equal unity. In an interior optimum, both (7) and (9) then would reduce to the same
condition,
¯u
0(yn ¡ bx;n + d
?
n) ¡ ±E[u
0(yn+1 ¡ bx;n+1 + d
?
n+1)jsn] = 0;
indicating that the government's portfolio choice would be indeterminate. This result
hinges on the fact that, due to the exogenous asset pricing kernel of investors, the price
of outstanding debt does not respond to the realization of shocks. If, in contrast, the
price of outstanding debt were state contingent because of an endogenous asset pricing
kernel, then the government's choice of maturity structure would be determinate (see
Gale, 1990; Angeletos, 2002).
If the government could commit its successors to honor maturing debt at state-
contingent repayment rates, all I? terms in the expressions above would again be absent;
all min[bx;n;Ln] terms would be replaced by bx;nrn; and all repayment probabilities would
correspond to the respective averages of state-contingent repayment rates chosen ex ante.
The optimal maturity structure then would be determinate if the returns to maturities
correlated di®erently with taxpayers' marginal utility, as in a standard portfolio choice
problem. Absent such di®erences in the correlation structure (for example because of
risk neutrality on the part of taxpayers), the choice of maturity structure would again be
indeterminate.
In the model of this paper, determinacy of the optimal maturity structure does not
rely on any of these features. In fact, the optimal maturity structure is pinned down
although the asset pricing kernel is exogenous and even if tax payers are risk neutral (see
below).
4 Special Cases
I now turn to several special cases of the model. In all of these cases, the marginal utility
of consumption is assumed to be exogenous. (As will become clear, this assumption can
sometimes be relaxed.) The level of disposable income and thus, bx;n, yn and Ln therefore
do not a®ect the government's rollover decision in period n. This simpli¯es the analysis
and allows to characterize the optimal maturity structure in closed form.
I consider three settings, distinguished by the underlying rationale for debt policy.
First, I focus on the role of impatience (small ±), and second, on the role of cyclicality of
output (re°ected in cyclical marginal utility). Finally, I brie°y discuss the implications
of risk.
4.1 Impatience
Suppose that u(c) = c for all n ¸ 0 and ± · ¯. The marginal e®ects from issuing short-
and long-term debt, (7) and (8) respectively, then reduce to
¯ (In;ss + In;sl) + (1 ¡ F(bx;n+1))(¯ ¡ ±); (10)
¯
2In;ll + ±¯E[In+1;ss + In+1;sljsn] + E[1 ¡ F(bx;n+2)jsn](¯
2 ¡ ±
2): (11)
14The I-terms on the left-hand side of these expressions re°ect the revenue losses on in-
framarginal units of debt; the terms on the right-hand side re°ect the consumption-
smoothing bene¯ts of a marginal unit of debt.
Depending on the value of the government's discount factor, ±, the marginal e®ects
(10) and (11) encompass three interesting scenarios. First, the case of ± = 0 where the
government exclusively cares about taxpayers' current consumption. The consumption
smoothing motive then reduces to the motive of raising revenue and the government
aims at attaining the maximum of the debt-La®er surface. As a consequence, all terms
in the government's objective function are proportional to taxpayers' utility in the cur-
rent period, implying that the assumption of risk neutrality is without loss of generality.
Formally, if ± = 0, the marginal e®ects (10) and (11) reduce to
In;ss + In;sl + 1 ¡ F(bx;n+1);
In;ll + E[1 ¡ F(bx;n+2)jsn]:
Second, the case of ± = ¯. In this case, consumption smoothing considerations are
absent from the government's program and the government exclusively aims at minimizing
the revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt. Formally, if ± = ¯, the marginal e®ects
(10) and (11) reduce to
In;ss + In;sl ;
In;ll + E[In+1;ss + In+1;sljsn] :
Note that, absent a consumption-smoothing motive, there is no reason for the govern-
ment to issue debt in the ¯rst place. When characterizing the ex-ante optimal maturity
structure in the case ± = ¯, I will therefore posit an exogenous revenue requirement in
the initial period.
Finally, the case of 0 < ± < ¯. In this intermediate case, the government's objective is
dynamic and the low discount factor generates a motive for the government to front load
consumption. In the quantitative sovereign debt literature, the assumption 0 < ± < ¯
is typically adopted because it is considered necessary to match high debt quotas in the
data (see, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2008).
As noted earlier, the linear utility assumption renders optimal debt issuance in period
n independent of bx;n, yn, and Ln. To see this, suppose the government in period n
expects subsequent rollover decisions to be una®ected by these variables, in particular
@b?
n+1;n+2(sn+1)=@bx;n+1 = 0. This implies In;sl = 0 such that the marginal e®ect of short-
term debt issuance, (10), reduces to ¯In;ss + (1 ¡ F(bx;n+1))(¯ ¡ ±) which is independent
of bx;n, yn, or Ln.
Scaling this marginal e®ect by the price of short-term debt yields ¡bn;n+1H(bx;n+1) +
(¯ ¡ ±)=¯ where H(L) ´ f(L)=(1 ¡ F(L)) denotes the hazard function. In what follows,
I assume that this hazard function is di®erentiable and weakly increasing|a rather weak
assumption.17 In this case, the marginal e®ect of short-term debt issuance is strictly
17Examples of distribution functions with increasing hazard functions include uniform, normal, expo-
nential, logistic, extreme value, Laplace, power, Weibull, gamma, chi-squared, chi, or beta distributions





de¯nes a smooth positive function b?
n;n+1(bn¡1;n+1) ¸ 0. Conditional on the amount of
outstanding debt, bn¡1;n+1, equation (12) therefore pins down a unique, positive level of
short-term debt issuance.
For later reference, note that the function bn¡1;n+1+b?
n;n+1(bn¡1;n+1) is strictly increas-
ing in bn¡1;n+1. For if H(L) is constant, the function b?
n;n+1(bn¡1;n+1) is constant as well;
and if H(L) is strictly increasing, then ¡1 < @b?
n;n+1(bn¡1;n+1)=@bx;n;n+1 < 0. Note also
that the same function is convex if the hazard function satis¯es a second-order criterion.
In particular, @2b?
n;n+1(bn¡1;n+1)=(@bx;n;n+1)2 ¸ 0 requires that the following condition be
satis¯ed:
(C) The function H0(L)2 ¡ H(L)H00(L) is weakly positive, for example because the
hazard function is concave.
(The exponential and Weibull distribution functions, among others, satisfy condition (C),
see footnote 17.)
Turning to the marginal e®ect of long-term debt issuance, (11), and maintaining the
assumption H0(L) ¸ 0, we again have In+1;sl = 0. Since b?
n+1;n+2(bn;n+2) is deterministic,
all expectation operators in (11) can be dropped. Moreover, since the expression in (10)
equals zero, the marginal e®ect simpli¯es to ¯2In;ll+(1¡F(bx;n+2))(¯2¡±¯). Scaled by the
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therefore pins down a unique, positive level of long-term debt issuance, b?
n;n+2 ¸ 0, if the
partial derivative on the left-hand side of the equation does not decline too quickly as a
function of bn;n+2. Under condition (C), for example, this is the case and the solution
therefore is unique. Note that b?
n;n+2 is independent of bx;n, bx;n;n+1, yn, or Ln.
Summarizing, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose that the utility function is linear, the hazard function weakly in-
creasing and ± · ¯. There exists an equilibrium in which the policy functions b?
n;n+1(sn)
and b?
n;n+2(sn) do not depend on bx;n, yn, or Ln, for all n ¸ 0. If the left-hand side of
equation (13) is increasing in bn;n+2, for example because condition (C) is satis¯ed, then
the maturity structure in this equilibrium is unique.
(see, e.g., Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).
If Ln is distributed according to an exponential distribution, F(L) = 1 ¡ exp(¡¸L), then the hazard
function is constant, H(L) = ¸.
If Ln is distributed according to a Weibull distribution, F(L) = 1 ¡ exp(¡L¸);¸ > 1, then the hazard
function is strictly increasing, H(L) = ¸L¸¡1; moreover, for 1 · ¸ · 2, the hazard function is concave,
and for all ¸ > 1, H0(L)2 ¡ H(L)H00(L) > 0.
16The equilibrium characterized in the Lemma is the only equilibrium that arises in
a ¯nite horizon economy, including the limiting case where the number of periods ap-
proaches in¯nity. This follows from a straightforward backward induction argument. In
the subsequent discussion, I focus on this type of equilibrium.
According to the ¯rst-order conditions (12) and (13), the government issues short-
and long-term debt as long as the marginal cost falls short of the marginal bene¯t.18 The
marginal cost, given on the left-hand side of the two conditions, is given by the revenue
losses on inframarginal debt (normalized by the price of the respective maturity). The
marginal bene¯t, on the right-hand sides, is given by the net utility gain from the revenue
and expected repayment of a marginal unit of debt (also normalized by the price of the
respective maturity). This gain varies with the value of ±=¯. If ± = 0, the gain equals
unity, the marginal utility of current consumption; if ± = ¯, the gain equals zero because
consumption smoothing considerations are absent from the government's program; ¯nally,
if 0 < ± < ¯, the gain lies between zero and one.
The optimal maturity structure depends on the value of ±=¯ as well as the shape
of the hazard function. Three constellations may arise. First, the case with a constant
hazard function and an arbitrary value for ±, 0 · ± · ¯. Second, the case of ± = ¯ and
an arbitrary, weakly increasing hazard function. Finally, the case of a strictly increasing
hazard function paired with a \small" value for ±, 0 · ± < ¯. I consider these cases in
turn.
If the hazard function is constant, condition (12) implies that b?
n;n+1(bn¡1;n+1) is a con-
stant function and thus, that the partial derivative in (13) equals zero. As a consequence,
the two conditions determine an interior and fully balanced maturity structure. Intuitively,
with a constant hazard function, both the revenue losses on inframarginal debt and the
revenue or smoothing gain from a marginal unit of debt only depend on the respective
maturity. The optimal amount of each maturity therefore is determined independently
of the other. Constancy of the hazard function also implies that the revenue losses on
inframarginal debt relative to the marginal revenue gain are a convex function of the
amount of debt issued. The optimal policy therefore smoothes maturities (or better, the
inframarginal losses associated with them), for parallel reasons as those driving Barro's
(1979) tax-smoothing prescription.
Since the quantities of short- and long-term debt issuance coincide in every period
and are constant across periods, the default risk is time invariant as well. The market
value of long-term debt issuance therefore constitutes a fraction ¯ of the market value of
short-term debt issuance. In this sense, the maturity structure is tilted towards short-term
debt. Moreover, in terms of the market value of stocks rather than °ows, the maturity
structure equals




Summarizing, we have the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the utility function is linear, the hazard function constant,
and 0 · ± · ¯. The unique optimal maturity structure is fully balanced in terms of
18If the hazard function is not weakly increasing, the optimal maturity structure might be concentrated.
17quantities, tilted towards short-term debt in terms of market values, and equal to 2¯¡1
in terms of market value of the stock of maturities.
Consider next the case where ± = ¯. Conditions (12) and (13) then imply b?
n;n+1 =
b?
n;n+2 = 0. Intuitively, absent a consumption-smoothing motive, the government solely
aims to avoid losses on inframarginal units of debt. Such losses arise if new debt is
issued because debt issuance depresses the price of inframarginal units. They also arise if
outstanding debt is prematurely redeemed (that is, if bx;n;n+1 > 0 and bn;n+1 < 0) because
debt redemption increases the price of inframarginal units, rendering debt issuance rather
than redemption bene¯cial. As a consequence, the optimal policy abstains both from
issuing and redeeming debt.
Suppose the government faces some exogenous revenue requirement in the initial pe-
riod, ¹ d0 > 0. The government's program then runs over just three periods, n = 0;1;2.
In particular, in period 0, the government issues short- and/or long-term debt, and in
periods 1 and 2, this debt may or may not be repaid at maturity. Since no new debt is
issued or prematurely redeemed, bx;1 = b0;1 and bx;2 = b0;2. Letting ¹ denote the multiplier
on the revenue requirement in the initial period, the ¯rst-order conditions characterizing
debt issuance in period n = 0 then read
b0;1H(b0;1) = ¹;
b0;2H(b0;2) = ¹
and the optimal maturity structure is fully balanced, for the same smoothing reasons
as before. Clearly, this result generalizes to settings with an arbitrary ¯nite number of
maturities. In summary:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the utility function is linear, the hazard function weakly
increasing, and ± = ¯. The unique optimal maturity structure in the initial period is fully
balanced in terms of quantities, and tilted towards short-term debt in terms of market
values.
Finally, consider the case of a strictly increasing hazard function paired with a \small"
value for ±, 0 · ± < ¯. The optimality condition (12) then implies that b?
n;n+1(bn¡1;n+1) is
strictly decreasing and thus, from (13), that the optimal maturity structure generally is
not balanced. (Condition (C) guarantees that the optimal maturity structure is unique.)
More speci¯cally, consider a stationary equilibrium to which the economy has con-





































Since the partial derivative is negative, the optimal maturity structure is tilted towards
long-term debt, b?
shrt < b?
long. Intuitively, with an increasing hazard function, higher
18outstanding debt in period n+1 drives up the revenue losses on inframarginal short-term
debt, discouraging short-term debt issuance in period n + 1. This, in turn, reduces the
revenue losses on inframarginal long-term debt in period n since long-term debt issuance
increases the amount of debt maturing in the long run by less than one-to-one. Ceteris
paribus, the government therefore ¯nds it \cheaper" to issue long-term debt.
If the partial derivative in the second equation is strictly increasing (as is the case, for
example, if Ln is distributed according to a Weibull distribution) then the tilt towards
long-term debt becomes smaller as the total amount of debt issued increases. Higher debt
quotas then go hand in hand with a shortening of the optimal maturity structure, in line
with the evidence cited earlier (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999).
Outside of a stationary equilibrium, closed form solutions obtain if Ln is distributed
according to a Weibull distribution with parameter ¸ = 2 such that the hazard function
equals H(L) = 2L and a unique interior optimum is guaranteed. Equation (12) can then




























For small values of bn¡1;n+1, the optimal maturity structure therefore is tilted towards
short-term debt; for larger values, it is tilted towards long-term debt. The maturity
structure converges after one period. In the stationary equilibrium, b?
n;n+1=b?
n;n+2 ¼ 0:7,
independently of the ratio ±=¯ and in line with the general ¯nding discussed earlier.
Summarizing, we have the following result:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the utility function is linear, the hazard function strictly
increasing, and 0 · ± < ¯. Condition (C) guarantees that the optimal maturity structure
is unique. In a stationary equilibrium, the unique optimal maturity structure is tilted
towards long-term debt; moreover, if the function in condition (C) is strictly positive,
higher debt quotas go hand in hand with a shortening of the maturity structure. During
the transition, the optimal maturity structure may be tilted towards long- or short-term
debt.
4.2 Cyclicality
I now turn to a setting with cyclical marginal utility of consumption. In particular, I
assume that in even periods, ue(c) = c, while in odd periods, uo(c) = uo ¢ c, with uo ¸ 1,
± < ¯, ±uo · ¯. This setting o®ers a useful approximation to an environment with
cyclical variation in exogenous output|high output in even periods and low output in
19odd periods. The approximation is exact if the e®ects of debt management on disposable
income are negligible compared with the e®ect of output variation.
Consider an equilibrium cycle with debt issuance (b?
short;e;b?
long;e) in even periods and
(b?
short;o;b?
long;o) in odd periods to which the economy has converged after a sequence of
su±ciently high realizations of L. In even periods, the marginal e®ects of short- and
long-term debt, (7) and (8) respectively, are given by
¯ (Ie;ss + Ie;sl) + (1 ¡ F(bx;o))(¯ ¡ ±uo);
¯
2Ie;ll + ±¯uo(Io;ss + Io;sl) + (1 ¡ F(bx;e)(¯
2 ¡ ±
2);
while in odd periods, they are given by











(Ie;ss + Ie;sl) + (1 ¡ F(bx;o)(¯
2 ¡ ±
2):
Constancy of marginal utility within a period implies as before that @b?
n;n+1(sn)=@bx;n =
0 and thus, Ie;sl = Io;sl = 0. Suppose that the hazard function H(L) is weakly increasing,













short;o + blong;e) = 1 ¡
±
¯uo
then de¯ne smooth positive functions, b?
short;e(blong;o) ¸ 0 and b?
short;o(blong;e) ¸ 0. Using
these ¯rst-order conditions to simplify the marginal e®ects of long-term debt issuance and





































which pin down unique, positive long-term debt levels, b?
long;e ¸ 0 and b?
long;o ¸ 0. Jointly,
the four conditions determine the maturity structure over the two-period cycle.
Consider the case with a constant hazard function (exponentially distributed income





long;o, such that the maturity structure is fully balanced with more debt being





default risk is constant over time. As a consequence, the revenue raised and the cash °ow
generated under the equilibrium debt policy are countercyclical|the market value of debt
issuance in periods with high marginal utility exceeds the market value of debt issuance
in periods with low marginal utility, and the same holds true net of debt repayment. The
20maturity structure in terms of market values is tilted towards short-term debt (by a factor








in even periods while it is smaller than 2¯¡1 in odd periods. Measured by market value
of the stocks, the maturity structure therefore shortens in periods preceding times of high
marginal utility. Summarizing:
Proposition 4. Suppose that marginal utility follows a two-period cycle, the hazard
function is constant, and 0 · ±uo · ¯;± < ¯. The unique optimal maturity structure
is fully balanced in terms of quantities and tilted towards short-term debt in terms of
market values. Revenue raised and cash °ow are countercyclical.
Figure 1 displays an example, illustrating how di®erent debt statistics depend on the
ratio of marginal utilities, uo.19 Solid lines in the ¯gure correspond with periods of low
marginal utility, dashed lines with periods of high marginal utility. The top two panels
show that the quantities of short- and long-term debt issued within a period coincide
while more debt is issued in periods of high marginal utility. According to the panels
in the second row, the equilibrium prices of short- and long-term debt do not vary over
the cycle (since the stock of maturing debt is constant over time). However, equilibrium
prices in more cyclical environments are higher, re°ecting lower quantities of maturing
debt as uo increases. The panels in the third row display the maturity structure in market
values, both in terms of °ows (on the left-hand side) and stocks (on the right-hand side).
Equilibrium quantities and prices imply that debt policy raises more revenue in peri-
ods of high marginal utility. The e®ect of debt policy on disposable household incomes
(in periods where the government does not default) is negative, but less so in periods
where resources are scarce, re°ecting front loading of consumption on the one hand and
consumption smoothing over the cycle on the other. With a smaller discount factor, the
equilibrium policy involves more debt, issued less cyclically, and generating more negative
cash °ows for households in \good" and \bad" times.
If the government could only issue short-term debt, these e®ects would be smaller.
Since the hazard function is constant, having access to one rather than two maturities
would lead the government to issue just half the quantity of debt in each period, raising
less revenue, and raising revenue less cyclically.
Relaxing the assumption of a constant and time invariant hazard function in Proposi-
tion 4 generates implications for the °ow maturity structure over the cycle. Suppose ¯rst
that the distribution of income losses in the wake of a default varies over time and main-
tain the assumption that this distribution is exponential. The previous derivations then
go through, except for the fact that the relevant hazard functions vary over time as well.
19Unless stated di®erently, the following examples are computed under the assumption that ¯ = 0:9
and ± = 0:5. The parameter of the exponential distribution equals ¸ = 2=
p
¼, the parameter of the
Weibull distribution equals ¸ = 2. The two distributions therefore have the same mean.
































































Plausibly, low realizations of L and thus (ceteris paribus), defaults are more likely in
times of scarce resources. This implies that the hazard rate in odd periods exceeds the
one in even periods, Á ¸ 1. As a consequence, the °ow maturity structure (in quantities
or market values) shortens in periods of scarce resources, in line with the evidence cited






















o. Figure 2 displays an example with Á = 1:1.
Proposition 5. Suppose that marginal utility follows a two-period cycle, the hazard
function is constant and the hazard rate correlates positively with marginal utility, and
0 · ±uo · ¯;± < ¯. The unique optimal maturity structure is cyclical in terms of
quantities and market values, shortening in periods of high marginal utility.
The result of a cyclical °ow maturity structure also follows, second, if F(¢) has a
strictly increasing hazard function rather than a time-varying one. In that case, the
e®ects summarized in Proposition 3 come into play. Due to the strictly negative partial
derivatives in the ¯rst-order conditions characterizing long-term debt issuance, the °ow
maturity structure is tilted towards long-term debt. This e®ect is relatively weaker in times
of high marginal utility where higher debt issuance is associated with a shortening of the
maturity structure, in line with the evidence (Broner et al., 2007). Formally, a result
along these lines can be proved if income losses in the wake of a default are assumed to
be distributed according to a Weibull distribution with parameter ¸ = 2. Under this














@uojuo=1. Figure 3 displays an example.
Proposition 6. Suppose that marginal utility follows a two-period cycle, Ln is distributed
according to a Weibull distribution with parameter ¸ = 2, and 0 · ±uo · ¯;± < ¯. The
unique optimal maturity structure is cyclical in terms of quantities and market values,
shortening in periods of high marginal utility.
These ¯ndings do not hinge on the assumption that the length of the cycle and the
maturity of long-term debt coincide. In fact, Proposition 6 can be modi¯ed to cover the
22case of a three-period cycle with marginal utility of consumption equal to unity during
the ¯rst two periods (periods 1 and 2) and uo ¸ 1 during the last, \odd" period. In such
a setting, the quantity of maturing debt and thus, debt prices vary over the cycle, see
Figure 4 for an example. Nevertheless, (lengthy) closed-form solutions again establish that
the maturity structure shortens in odd periods where resources are scarcest; in period 1,






















Proposition 7. Suppose that marginal utility follows a three-period cycle, Ln is dis-
tributed according to a Weibull distribution with parameter ¸ = 2, and 0 · ±uo · ¯;± <
¯. The unique optimal maturity structure is cyclical in terms of quantities and market
values, shortening towards periods of high marginal utility.
4.3 Risk
Risk introduces three new elements in the analysis, even if marginal utility is exogenous.
To see this, recall the marginal e®ects of short- and long-term debt issuance in period n,
(7) and (9) respectively. Stochastic marginal utility renders short-term debt issuance in
the subsequent period and thus, the quantity of debt maturing in the long term stochastic.
As a consequence, the condition characterizing long-term debt issuance involves the ratio
of the expected probability density and cumulative density. Stochastic marginal utility also
implies that the marginal e®ect of short-term debt issuance features the expected marginal
utility in the subsequent period. Finally, it implies that the marginal e®ect of long-term
debt issuance includes the covariance between marginal utility in the subsequent period
and the repayment probability in the long term as well as between the rollover policy
in the subsequent period and the marginal default probability in the long term. The
implications of these new elements for the optimal maturity structure can be analyzed
numerically.
5 Cross Default
Sovereign defaults often involve repudiation of maturing and outstanding debt. In an
environment where governments cannot commit, such cross defaults on outstanding debt
cannot be interpreted as choices by the government in power since the ¯nal decision on
the repayment of currently outstanding debt will be taken by a subsequent government.
Instead, cross defaults can be interpreted as debt buybacks at very low prices, where the
price drop re°ects equilibrium expectations about the subsequent government's default
decision.
In the following, I analyze a setting that generates such equilibrium expectations and
accordingly, cross default. Slightly modifying the structure of income losses in the wake
of a default, I make the extreme assumption that a default on maturing debt in period n
(carrying income losses Ln) reduces the cost for the subsequent government of defaulting
on debt outstanding in period n to zero. A default on maturing debt therefore triggers a
complete devaluation of the outstanding debt in the period as well.
23With this modi¯ed structure of income losses, the government's program only changes
as far as the law of motion for debt maturing in the subsequent period is concerned. This
law of motion now reads
bx;n+1 = 1[rn=1]bx;n;n+1 + b
?
n;n+1(sn);
where the indicator function multiplying bx;n;n+1 is the novel feature.
Since a default on maturing debt triggers a cross default on outstanding debt, the





1 if Ln ¸ bx;n + ®?
n(sn)
0 if Ln < bx;n + ®?
n(sn) ; (14)
where the positive function ®?
n(sn) is de¯ned by the condition that the government be
indi®erent between repaying and defaulting,
u(yn ¡ bx;n + d
?
n(sn)) + ±E[Gn+1(sn+1)jsn] j no default in period n




n(sn)) + ±E[Gn+1(sn+1)jsn] j default in period n:
To analyze the government's modi¯ed program it is useful to introduce some nota-
tion. Let 1 ¡ Fn+1 ´ 1 ¡ F(bx;n+1 + ®?
n+1(sn+1)jyn+1) denote the probability of repay-
ment in period n + 1, conditional on yn+1. Similarly, let 1 ¡ Fn+2 ´ 1 ¡ F(bx;n+2 +
®?
n+2(sn+2)jyn+1;yn+2;rn+1 = 1) denote the probability of repayment in period n+2, con-
ditional on yn+1;yn+2 and no default in period n+1. Finally, let fn+1 and fn+2 denote the
corresponding probability density functions. Condition (14) implies that the equilibrium
prices of debt maturities are given by
qn;n+1 = ¯E[rn+1jsn] = ¯Ey[1 ¡ Fn+1jsn]; (15)
qn;n+2 = ¯
2E[rn+2jsn] = ¯
2Ey[(1 ¡ Fn+1)(1 ¡ Fn+2)jsn]; (16)
where Ey indicates that expectations are taken with respect to yn+1 or yn+1;yn+2. The
central di®erence to the main model relates to the price of long-term debt: Since long-
term debt is only repaid if short-term debt is repaid (and Ln+2 is su±ciently high), the
price of long-term debt is bounded above by ¯ times the price of short-term debt.
The de¯cit can then be expressed as
dn = bn;n+1¯Ey[1 ¡ Fn+1jsn] + bn;n+2¯
2Ey[(1 ¡ Fn+1)(1 ¡ Fn+2)jsn]



































Ey [(1 ¡ Fn+1)(1 ¡ Fn+2)jsn]+bn;n+2Ey
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Relative to the main model, debt issuance a®ects the de¯cit through several new
channels. On the one hand, long-term debt issuance reduces the value of short-term debt
because the former a®ects the default decision in the short run (this gives rise to the new
term In;ls). On the other hand, short- or long-term debt issuance reduces the value of
long-term debt, also by increasing the risk of default in the short run.
Turning to the envelope conditions, consider ¯rst the e®ect of a marginal increase of
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= ¡Ey[(1 ¡ Fn+1)u
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n+1)jsn]:
The marginal e®ect of outstanding debt depends on the default decision in the period, in
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n = yn ¡ 1[rn=1]bx;n ¡ (1 ¡ 1[rn=1])Ln + d?
n. Similarly, the e®ect of a marginal
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where the price qn+1;n+2 refers to states without default.
There are two main di®erences between the marginal e®ects (19){(21) and the cor-
responding e®ects in the main model, (7){(9). First, the risk of cross default modi¯es
the revenue losses on inframarginal debt and introduces new types of such losses, as dis-
cussed earlier. Second, since debt repayment in the short run is a precondition for debt
repayment in the long run, the burden of long-term debt in (20) and (21) is evaluated in
repayment states rather than all states of nature, and multiplied by the factor 1 ¡ Fn+1.
In parallel with the strategy pursued earlier, I assume from now on that marginal utility
of consumption is exogenous. The realization of yn therefore does not a®ect the choice of
repayment rate or debt issuance. This renders ®?
n a function of outstanding debt only and
implies that the conditional distribution functions Fn+1 and Fn+2 can be replaced by their
unconditional counterparts (Fn+2 continues to be conditioned on rn+1 = 1). Accordingly,
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Let Gn+1(sn+1)default denote the value for the government in period n+1 of defaulting,
net of the income loss Ln+1, and let Gn+1(sn+1)no default denote the value for the govern-
ment in period n + 1 of not defaulting. Finally, let u0
n denote the exogenous marginal





n+1bx;n+1 ¡ Gn+1(sn+1)no default
u0
n+1









¡ ¯(In+1;ss + In+1;sl)
= ¯(1 ¡ Fn+2)
where the last equality uses (19). Intuitively, an increase in the amount of outstanding
debt increases the critical income loss ^ Ln+1 at which the government in period n + 1 is
indi®erent between defaulting and not defaulting twofold. First, because a default wipes





Second, because a default improves the conditions subject to which the government issues
new debt, by reducing the default probability in period n + 2. Optimality of short-term
debt issuance in period n + 1 (condition (19)) assures that the sum of these two e®ects
reduces to the market price of outstanding debt.
27Using these results, the e®ects on the government's objective of marginal increases in







































where the second expression uses condition (21). It follows that b?
n;n+2 = 0 constitutes an
equilibrium with b?







Intuitively, issuing short-term debt generates consumption smoothing bene¯ts on the
one hand and revenue losses on inframarginal short- and long-term debt on the other.
These revenue losses arise because debt issuance drives up the probability of default in
the subsequent period. Long-term debt issuance generates the same ratio of inframarginal
revenue losses due to higher default risk in the short term and consumption smoothing
bene¯ts. In addition, however, long-term debt issuance also generates revenue losses due
to higher default risk in the long term, conditional on no default in the short term.
Proposition 8. Suppose that marginal utility is exogenous and the hazard function
weakly increasing. In the model with cross default, only short-term debt is issued.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the e®ect of cross default on default choices and expected
repayment rates and prices.20 The ¯rst ¯gure illustrates the case without cross default
(the main model) while the second ¯gure illustrates the case with cross default. In both
¯gures, the top left panel displays the values of Ln at which the government is indi®erent
between defaulting and repaying, conditional on the stock of maturing and outstanding




n(bx;n;bx;n;n+1;Ln)dF(Ln). The bottom left panel displays the expected
price of outstanding debt, namely
R 1
0 q?
n;n+1dF(Ln) in the case without cross default and R 1
0 1[r?
n=1]q?
n;n+1dF(Ln) in the case with cross default. Finally, the bottom right panel




Several points are worth stressing. First, the threshold value for Ln increases one-
to-one with the level of maturing debt. In the case with cross default, it also increases
with the level of outstanding debt. Intuitively, outstanding debt depresses the price of
newly-issued debt. A higher stock of outstanding debt therefore renders a default more
attractive|even if ± = 0. Second, this positive e®ect of outstanding debt on the default
threshold in the model with cross default results in a negative e®ect of outstanding debt
on the expected repayment rate which is not present in the model without cross default.
Third, in the model without cross default, the expected price of outstanding debt on
the one hand and of newly-issued short-term debt on the other is equal to each other.
20The examples are computed under the assumption that ¯ = 0:9 and ± = 0. Income losses are
distributed exponentially with parameter ¸ = 1.
28In the model with cross default, this is not the case. There, the price of outstanding
debt re°ects the fact that both maturing and outstanding debt determine the e®ective
default probability. Since new short-term debt can be issued at better conditions after an
e®ective default on outstanding debt, the price of the equilibrium quantity of newly-issued
short-term debt increases in the stock of maturing debt.
6 Conclusion
Lack of commitment to debt repayment paired with social losses in the wake of a de-
fault gives rise to a determinate optimal maturity structure. This structure is critically
shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt, re°ecting the price impact of
default and rollover choices by subsequent policy makers. Under plausible conditions,
such inframarginal revenue losses normalized by the price of debt are a convex function
of the quantity of a maturity issued. Optimal policy therefore amounts to \smoothing"
the revenue losses on inframarginal units of maturities, in parallel with the familiar tax
(distortion) smoothing prescription.
The cost of a default has important implications for the optimal maturity structure. I
have considered two extreme cases: First, the situation where default costs do not directly
depend on default choices in the past, and second, the situation with such direct depen-
dence. If default costs are independent, default probabilities are a function of the stock of
maturing debt only. Moreover, if default costs are distributed exponentially, then future
rollover decisions are independent of the stock of outstanding debt. As a consequence,
spillover e®ects between di®erent maturities are minimal and the smoothing prescription
implies a fully balanced maturity structure. If default costs are distributed according to
any other distribution with increasing hazard, then outstanding debt depresses short-term
debt issuance. Long-term debt issuance therefore increases the debt maturing in the long
term by less than one-to-one, reducing the associated inframarginal losses. Accordingly,
the optimal maturity structure is tilted towards the long end. Higher quantities of debt
reduce this cost advantage of long-term debt, giving rise to a more balanced maturity
structure.
Over the cycle, total debt issuance increases in times of high marginal utility. If the
hazard function is strictly increasing, the maturity structure therefore shortens during
such times as well. A parallel result holds if default costs are distributed exponentially,
provided that these costs tend to be lower in times of scarce resources.
If default costs are dependent over time such that a default on maturing debt triggers
a subsequent default on currently outstanding debt, then default probabilities depend on
the stock of maturing and outstanding debt. This renders the default decision dynamic
and implies that long-term debt issuance is always dominated by short-term issuance such
that the maturity structure is concentrated on the short end.
The broad picture that emerges from the model is one of an interior and roughly bal-
anced maturity structure that shortens in periods of high debt issuance, high marginal
utility (\crises"), and increased risk of cross default and acceleration. While the empir-
ical evidence is broadly consistent with these predictions, future research should aim at
29improving our understanding of default induced losses. As this paper has shown, the
characteristics of these losses crucially a®ect the maturity structure of countries with
credibility problems.
A Alternative Speci¯cations of Social Losses
Corner solutions for the optimal repayment rate follow under more general assumptions
about the losses in the wake of a default. Consider for example the case where income
losses are proportional to Ln and the default rate,
lossesn = (1 ¡ rn)Ln:
The optimal repayment choice then is identical to the one given in the text.
Consider next the situation where income losses are proportional to Ln and the total
amount defaulted upon,
lossesn = (1 ¡ rn)bx;nLn:
The optimal repayment rate then varies with Ln but does not depend on the amount of
maturing debt, rendering such a speci¯cation unattractive.
Consider next the situation where income losses are a concave function of the amount
defaulted upon, for example
lossesn = [(1 ¡ rn)bx;n]
1=2Ln
or
lossesn = 1[rn<1]Ln + k(1 ¡ rn)bx;n; 0 < k < 1:
Again, the optimal repayment rate then equals either unity or zero since the total cost
from debt repayment and income losses is a concave function of the default rate.
If income losses are a convex function of the amount defaulted upon, for example
lossesn = [(1 ¡ rn)bx;n]
2Ln;
then the equilibrium repayment rate is no longer discrete. However, convexity of income
losses appears less plausible than the previously discussed speci¯cations, for at least two
reasons. First, most notions of income losses are consistent with concave costs: The
marginal cost of defaulting on the ¯rst 5 percent of debt exceeds the one from defaulting
on the following 5 percent. Second, convex income losses would lead governments to
always default at least partially, in contrast with the empirical evidence.
B Social Losses and the Incentive to Dilute
In this section, I analyze how the assumption of social losses in the wake of a default
shapes the government's rollover decision. I focus on the case where the government only












while the marginal e®ect of short-term debt issuance on the government's objective is
given by
u








0(yn ¡ min[bx;n;Ln] + d
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n) ¡ ±E[u





To understand the role played by social losses, consider an alternative setup without
such losses. Assume as before that the government either fully repays the maturing debt
or su®ers a cost Ln. In contrast to the main model, however, suppose now that this cost
corresponds to a transfer to bondholders rather than a social loss. One can interpret this
modi¯ed setting as a situation where the realization of Ln determines the bargaining power
of bondholders vis-a-vis the government. According to this interpretation, bondholders
can successfully press for full repayment if the realization of Ln is high. If the realization
of Ln falls short of the maturing debt, however, bondholders must concede and settle for
a reduced repayment equal to Ln.





1 if Ln ¸ bx;n
Ln
bx;n if Ln < bx;n
and the expected repayment rate therefore features a new component that accounts for
payments in the partial default case:






























The presence of transfers rather than social losses introduces three marginal e®ects
in addition to those present in the main model. First, the increase in bn;n+1 raises more




0 Ln+1dF(Ln+1). Second, as re°ected in the term bn;n+1f(bx;n+1), an
increase in bn;n+1 raises the probability of partial repayment of the newly-issued debt
at the critical income loss, bx;n+1. Finally, the increase in bn;n+1 causes revenue losses





0 Ln+1dF(Ln+1), because it reduces the
repayment rate in case of partial default.
The second of these additional e®ects cancels with the loss on inframarginal debt that
is already present in the main model. Intuitively, the revenue gain due to more likely,
partial repayment exactly compensates for the revenue loss due to less likely, full repay-










. If 0 < bx;n;n+1 < bx;n+1 such that debt is out-
standing and the government issues additional debt, then this marginal e®ect exceeds
¯(1 ¡ F(bx;n+1)) because debt issuance e®ectively redistributes collateral from outstand-
ing to newly-issued debt, in contrast with the situation in the main model.
The government's program in period n is unchanged relative to the original setup,
except for the modi¯ed expression characterizing the de¯cit. (From the government's
point of view, it is irrelevant whether income losses in period n+1 correspond to transfers
to bond holders rather than social losses.) The e®ect of a marginal increase in bn;n+1
therefore equals
u
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re°ecting the same consumption-smoothing e®ect as in the main model (in the second
line), but a modi¯ed revenue e®ect on inframarginal units of debt (in the ¯rst line).
Without social losses in the wake of a default as they are present in the original setup,
the government therefore has an incentive to dilute outstanding debt.
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Figure 1: Debt policies if marginal utility follows a two-period cycle and income losses in
the wake of a default are distributed according to an exponential distribution. The ¯gure
plots debt statistics as functions of the ratio of marginal utilities, uo; solid lines correspond
with periods of low marginal utility, dashed lines with periods of high marginal utility.
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Figure 2: Debt policies if marginal utility follows a two-period cycle, income losses in the
wake of a default are distributed according to an exponential distribution, and the hazard
rate in periods with high marginal utility exceeds the rate in periods with low marginal
utility. The ¯gure plots debt statistics as functions of the ratio of marginal utilities, uo;
solid lines correspond with periods of low marginal utility, dashed lines with periods of
high marginal utility.
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Figure 3: Debt policies if marginal utility follows a two-period cycle and income losses in
the wake of a default are distributed according to a Weibull distribution. The ¯gure plots
debt statistics as functions of the ratio of marginal utilities, uo; solid lines correspond
with periods of low marginal utility, dashed lines with periods of high marginal utility.
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Figure 4: Debt policies if marginal utility follows a three-period cycle and income losses in
the wake of a default are distributed according to a Weibull distribution. The ¯gure plots
debt statistics as functions of the ratio of marginal utilities, uo; solid and long-dashed
lines correspond with periods of low marginal utility (periods 1 and 2, respectively),

































expected price of short−term debt
outstanding debt
Figure 5: Default choices and expected repayment rates and prices in the model without
cross default if income losses in the wake of a default are distributed according to an

































expected price of short−term debt
outstanding debt
Figure 6: Default choices and expected repayment rates and prices in the model with
cross default if income losses in the wake of a default are distributed according to an
exponential distribution and ± = 0.
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